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I. 
THIS APPEAL DOES NOT INVOLVE A MEDIA'S RIGHT OF 
ACCESS TO CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL FOR PURPOSES 
OF PUBLICATION AND DISSEMINATION 
Salt Lake City Corporation (the "City") devotes a 
significant portion of its brief explaining that the media 
has no special right of access to confidential governmental 
material for the purposes of publication, broadcast or 
dissemination. This appeal, however, does not present a 
question of the media's general right of access to 
government papers for those purposes. 
Rather, this Court must determine whether the City 
may block United Television, Inch's ("United Television") 
discovery of documents which the City claims are 
confidential in a pending defamation case brought by a 
governmental agent against the media defendant. 
Significantly, neither the plaintiff, David Madsen 
("Madsen"), nor the City claim the information sought is not 
relevant to the issues presented by this action under Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a). 
The City presents a virtual bibliography of cases 
supporting the proposition that the First Amendment does not 
grant the media a key to all secret government files. Not 
one of the cases, however, involves the right of a media 
defendant in a defamation case to discover relevant 
information. 
The City quotes extensively from Redding v. 
Jacobsen, 638 P.2d 503 (Utah 1981) where a private citizen 
attacked the constitutionality of a statute which prohibited 
disclosure of personally identifiable salaries paid to 
employees, including university faculty members, of the 
State's System of Higher Education. The question of a party 
litigant's rights to relevant information, and especially 
the rights of a media defendant to relevant information in a 
libel suit, was not raised, discussed or even considered in 
that case. 
The only case cited by the City in which the 
government claimed privilege in order to limit a party 
litigant's discovery is United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 
1 (19$2). That case involved claims brought under the Tort 
Claims Act for the death of civilians killed in the crash of 
a military airplane which was involved in testing secret 
electronic equipment. The decedents' widows brought suit 
against the United States government and requested 
production of the Air Force's official accident 
investigation report. The Secretary of the Air Force 
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claimed a privilege because the report concerned the secret 
electronic military equipment. The Supreme Court ruled the 
report did not have to be produced because it revealed 
military secrets about the equipment affecting national 
security. The Supreme Court also noted there was nothing to 
suggest the secret electronic equipment had any causal 
connection with the accident and that the United States had 
offered to produce the surviving crew member's for 
depositions. 
This case does not involve national security or 
military secrets* Furthermore/ unlike the secret material 
in Reynoldsy the confidential information here is relevant 
to the issues presented by this action. Additionally, the 
City has not offered to produce any of the complaining 
witnesses identified in the Internal Affairs files or the 
investigating officers for depositions. In fact, without 
the files. United Television cannot learn the names of these 
people. 
Not one of the other cases cited by the City in the 
first three points of its brief involved a litigant's right 
to discover relevant or exculpatory evidence. Zemel v. 
Rush/ 381 U.S. 1 (1965)/ concerned an individual's right to 
have his passport validated for Cuba. The court found that 
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the State Department's refusal to validate the passport did 
not infringe upon any first amendment rights the individual 
may have had to gather information. New York Times v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1970) was the famous "Pentagon 
Papers" case involving issues of prior restraint. Houchins 
v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1977) addressed the media's right 
of access to a jail, specifically the site of a suicide in 
the jail. In Society of Professional Journalists v. 
Secretary of Labor, 616 F.Supp. 569 (D. Utah 1985) the press 
was seeking access to hearings conducted by the Mine Safety 
and Health Administration. None of these cases are 
instructive for the issues presented in this case. 
The other cases cited by the City are equally 
unilluminating. Press Enterprises Co. v. Superior Court of 
California, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) concerned the media's right of 
access to a criminal preliminary hearing. Similarly, in 
State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33 (Utah 1981) the court examined 
a trial court's right to clear a courtroom temporarily 
during trial. And, in First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial 
Inquiry and Review Board, 784 F.2d 467 (3rd Cir. 1986), the 
plaintiffs were attempting to gain access to the records of 
the Pennsylvania Judicial Inquiry and Review Board in order 
to publish and disseminate the information. Not one of 
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those cases involved a party's right to discover information 
relevant to issues being litigated in a pending action* 
More importantly, not one of those cases touched on a media 
defendant's right to discover exculpatory evidence in a 
defamation action brought by a government agent. 
This appeal does not concern the scope of the 
media's right to examine the government's papers for 
purposes of informing the public. This appeal will 
determine the government's ability to hide the truth from a 
party defending a lawsuit in order to aid a government 
agent's case. Because the lawsuit is a defamation action 
that will impact the functional application of the First 
Amendment and because the result of this appeal will define 
the fundamental fairness of the judicial process, the 
government's secrecy claims must be overridden. 
II. 
THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS FILES ARE RELEVANT TO 
THE ISSUES PRESENTED IN THIS ACTION 
The City ignores the evidentiary importance of the 
Internal Affairs files claiming United Television did not 
rely upon these records when it broadcast the stories about 
Madsen killing Clemente Garcia. Reliance or non-reliance 
is not an element of defamation, nor is reliance relevant to 
the defense of the defamation action. While the primary 
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source of the information relied upon by United Television 
is relevant in determining whether or not United Television 
acted with malice, New York Times Co, v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S, 323 
(1974), it is not an issue of the basic defamation claim. 
Truth, however, is very much at issue. 
In his complaint, Madsen alleges the broadcasts 
were defamatory because it was reported he "had a poor 
record with the police department." (R. 2-7)(emphasis 
added) . Madsen also asserts that these allegedly defamatory 
statements injured his reputation within the community and 
within the police department. (R. 2-7). 
Neither the City nor Madsen claim that the Internal 
Affairs files are not part of Madsen's "record." Nor can it 
be disputed that truth is an essential ingredient in any 
defamation action. As this Court has repeatedly stated 
"[t]ruth of the words spoken is always a defense. . . ." 
Direct Import Buyers1 Association v. K.S.L., Inc., 572 P.2d 
692, 694 (Utah 1977); see also, Ogden Bus Lines v. KSL, 
Inc. , 551 P.2d 222, 224 (Utah 1976); Restatement of Torts, 
Second, § 581A. 
In order to determine whether or not Madsen 
actually had a poor record with the police department, 
- 6 -
United Television must examine his entire record, including 
the Internal Affairs fileSc The number of complaints alone, 
seventy-seven, and the number of complaints sustained 
against Madsen, five, demonstrate how important this 
information is to determine the truth. (R. 158-62). United 
Television's news sources may qualify as witnesses to 
testify about some of this information. Under the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, however, these witnesses may not be 
qualified to testify about all of the information found in 
these files, even if they have some knowledge of all 
seventy-seven complaints and the attendant investigations. 
Furthermore, the information may be necessary for 
impeachment purposes. For example, if a fellow officer who 
may have participated in the investigations testifies that 
Madsen1s record is good, these files may contain statements 
showing the testimony is false. Likewise, the names of the 
complainants and the names of the investigating and 
reviewing officers who obviously will be able to testify as 
percipient witnesses are found in these files. No other 
reliable source for the names of these witnesses has been 
identified by either the City or Madsen. 
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Similarly, these files contain evidence as to the 
reputation of Madsen both within the community and within 
the police departmento The City, however, writes: 
The fact Madsenfs reputation with the 
LA. complainants is bad is not the 
issue. The issue is Madsen's record with 
the department. This is better developed 
by testimony of co-workers and supervisors 
than with complainants. 
City's Brief at 34 (emphasis added). 
Even under the City's view of how evidence should 
be developed and presented and which evidence is "better," 
these files are undeniably relevant. The names of the "co-
workers" and "supervisors" are contained in the files. 
Furthermore, the files themselves contain information 
bearing on Madsen's reputation. Maybe more importantly, the 
files contain the truthful information against which 
Madsenfs co-workers' and supervisors' opinions can be 
weighed and, possibly, impeached. 
Despite the City's contention, Madsen's reputation 
with the citizen complainants is at issue. The complainants 
are part of this community. Madsen alleges he enjoys a good 
reputation among these people. Many of the witnesses who 
can rebut this contention and testify about Madsen's true 
reputation are identified in these files. 
- 8 -
This appeal does not involve the question of 
whether or not this information is relevant. The question 
is whether or not any privilege or governmental interest 
justifies keeping this information secret even though it is 
relevant to the issues in the lawsuit and is absolutely 
necessary if the truth is to be presented to the jury. 
III. 
THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCUMENTS 
ARE NOT PROTECTED BY ANY PRIVILEGE 
The City claims Utah Code Ann. §78-24-8(5) 
establishes a privilege for these documents. Both the words 
of the statute and this Court's interpretation of the 
statute demonstrate its inapplicability to these 
documents. The statutory privilege applies only to 
examination of an officer concerning his confidential 
communications with another person. By its terms, the 
statute does not apply to documentary materials. 
Furthermore, the City has not made an adequate showing that 
the documents contain any confidential communications. See 
§IV below. 
In State v. Hoben, 36 Utah 186, 102 P. 1000 (1909), 
this Court, construing the predecessor to §78-24-8(5), 
carefully explained that the statute applied to "state 
secrets, and communications by informers to public 
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officials." Id. 102 P. at 1004 (emphasis added). There is 
no claim the Internal Affairs files concern any "state 
secrets/1 nor is there any indication these files contain 
any informant reports. In fact, the information supplied by 
the City so far indicates that rather than informant 
reports, these files contain citizen complaints. 
Furthermore, even if the statutory privilege 
applies, it is not an absolute privilege, but rather a 
qualified privilege which may only be invoked when "the 
public interest would suffer by disclosure." As admitted by 
the City, numerous factors must be considered to determine 
if the public interest would suffer by disclosure. As shown 
in United Television's initial brief and in §V below, these 
factors dictate the files be disclosed. 
IV. 
THE CITY DOES NOT MAINTAIN 
CONFIDENTIALITY OF THESE DOCUMENTS 
These documents are not treated as privileged or 
confidential by the City. Despite the self-serving 
protestations found in the affidavits filed by the police 
officers, (R. 106 & 99) the City's own procedures allow the 
information to be disseminated. The target of the complaint 
is allowed to obtain a copy of the complaint (Addendum 3 to 
United Television's appeal brief at 1) and the chief of 
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police may release the information to the police officer's 
attorneys* (Ich at 7, 1|4d.(l)). No special procedures are 
required before the information is released, nor do the 
City's procedures require any protection or control of the 
information once it is released. It is most revealing, 
however, that the procedures demand strong resistance to any 
judicial disclosure: 
Upon receipt of a subpoena; however, 
any subpoena will be strongly resisted by 
the chief of police and a court order 
requested prior to release of information. 
(Id. at 7, 114d. (2) ) . 
Also revealing is the fact that the City's 
procedures do not require any notification to the citizen 
complainant, the investigating officers or other witnesses 
who supplied information "in confidence" when the files are 
released to the target officer or his counsel. Nor are any 
of these people even warned that the information may be 
disseminated. The police procedures allowing the target 
officer and his counsel to obtain the files blatantly 
contradict the concerns expressed in Acting Chief Johnson's 
and Lieutenant Thirsk's affidavits (R. 110 & 99) about the 
"chilling" effect of dissemination. Or possibly, the City 
actively conceals the truth from the complaining citizen's 
and from the other witnesses. 
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Additionally, the affidavits claiming the 
information is confidential do not meet the rudimentary 
foundation requirements to be considered valid evidence* 
Utah R. Evidc 602. Significantly, the affidavit filed by 
Acting Chief Johnson (R. 110) is identical to the affidavit 
filed by Chief E.L. "Bud11 Willoughby in support of the 
City's similar unsuccessful attempt to prevent disclosure in 
Meyers v. Salt Lake City Corp., 747 P.2d 1058 (Utah App. 
1987). Not surprisingly, the affidavit of Lt. Thirsk is 
almost word for word identical to Acting Chief Johnson's and 
former Chief Willoughby's affidavits. The more than 
coincidental similarity of all three affidavits proves the 
wisdom of the admonition found in Kelly v. City of San Jose, 
114 F.R.D. 653, (N.D. Cal. 1987). In the Kelly opinion, the 
court pointedly cautioned that police affidavits claiming 
privilege on the grounds of public interest are, by 
themselves, insufficient to overcome the substantial burden 
placed on the government to justify denying a litigant his 
usual discovery rights. I_d. at 672. 
Moreover, a careful examination of these affidavits 
reveals further evidentiary inadequacies. Neither affidavit 
identifies a single individual who was promised 
confidentiality before supplying information. The best that 
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either officer can say is that informants are "commonly'1 
told the information will be treated as confidential. See 
Johnson Affidavit at 118 (R. 106) and Thirsk Affidavit at 118 
(R. 99)c So-called "common" practice does not establish the 
required foundation to claim confidentiality was promised to 
anyone who supplied information in these specific seventy-
seven files. 
Additionally, these files are not informant files 
but rather are citizen complaints. Citizens complain before 
anyone promises them anything. Nor can the City claim the 
participating officers expect complete confidentiality when 
the City's own procedures allow for disclosure. 
In fact, the affidavits only prove that the police 
department withholds the truth from citizen complainants. 
Apparently, the complainants are not told that the 
information may be turned over to the target officer and his 
counsel. 
Both officers also swear it is their experience 
"that if citizens feel they might be revealed as 
'informants1 in their community, they would not, generally, 
give any information to investigation officers." (R. 110 at 
119 & R. 99 at 118). The City's argument and the officer's 
experience are irrelevant in this instance. Like ancient 
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alchemists transforming lead into gold, Acting Chief Johnson 
and Lt. Thirsk transform "complaining citizens'* into 
"informants." As with the ancient alchemists, the 
transformation is not possible. These people are not 
"informants." There is no evidence to indicate the citizens 
who complain about Madsen's brutal conduct will be loath to 
do so if their complaints are revealed to a defendant in a 
lawsuit initiated by Madsen, the target of their complaints. 
In summary, the affidavits do not support the 
City's claim of confidentiality. Nor do they offer any 
empirical evidence that the public interest will suffer by 
disclosure in this action. 
The City also relies upon Magistrate Gould's ruling 
in Russo v. Madsen, filed in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, No. 88C-852W. By its own 
terms, the order is not applicable to the issues presented 
above. As Magistrate Gould noted on the face of the order, 
the Russo case involved claims against the City and Madsen's 
supervisors asserting the defendants were liable for 
deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional rights 
by inadequately training, supervising and retaining Madsen 
as a police officer. Magistrate Gould pointed out in his 
order that the principle of vicarious liability did not 
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apply in that case and, hence, ruled the documents not 
discoverable. Therefore, the scope of the Magistrate's 
review had no bearing on the relevance of this information 
to this defamation action where Madsen's "record" is at 
issue. 
V. 
BALANCING OF THE RELEVANT FACTORS MANDATES DISCLOSURE 
Even the City admits that in order to determine if 
these files must be produced, the court should apply the 
balancing test originally established in Denver Policemen's 
Association v. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1981) 
and cited approvingly by the Utah Court of Appeals in Meyers 
Vo Salt Lake City Corp. , supra. Both the Meyers court and 
the Lichtenstein court ordered production of the documents, 
documents similar to the Internal Affairs files sought here. 
Every argument advanced by the City to persuade 
this Court that the "public interest" would suffer by 
disclosure has been thoroughly considered by other courts, 
and inevitably rejected. See, Denver Policemen's Association 
v. Lichtenstein, supra; King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180; (E.D. 
N.Y. 1988); Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, (N.D. 
Cal. 1987); Mercy v. County of Suffolk, 93 F.R.D. 520 
(E.D.N.Y. 1982); Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 344 
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(E.D. Pa. 1973); Wood v. Breiery 54 F.RoD, 7 (E.D. Wis. 
1972); Barfield v. City Of Seattle, 676 P.2d 438 (Wash, 
1984); Martinelli v. District Court, 612 P.2d 1083 (Col. 
1980). In fact, the City has not cited one case where 
discovery was prohibited when the court determined the 
allegedly secret information was relevant to a party's case 
or defense. 
The City argues that some citizens will not file 
complaints or provide information to the Internal Affairs 
department if their identity may become known* The 
affidavits relied upon by the City, as shown above in §IV, 
make no such empirical showing. The affidavits set forth 
the opinions of the officers without any supporting factual 
evidence. 
The City asks this Court to believe that people who 
complain to the police department about Madsen's brutal 
behavior would not do so if they discovered their complaints 
may be used to defeat a defamation claim asserted by 
Madsen. The logical absurdity of that argument is self-
apparent. Numerous courts, recognizing the fallacy of that 
type of argument, have rejected it. See, e.g., 
Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d at 437; King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. at 
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194 Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. at 344; Martinelli v. 
District Court, 612 P.2d at 1090. 
The City also claims the people supplying 
information to the Internal Affairs files will not cooperate 
because of fear of retaliation by the officers if the 
information is disclosed. Yet, the City's own procedures 
allow the target officer to obtain a copy of the complaint 
and allow the officer's counsel to obtain the complete 
file. Obviously, the City's "concern" about retaliation is 
belated and transparently insincere. 
The City also pleads that officers will not 
cooperate in these investigations if this material is 
produced in this litigation, a sad commentary on the City's 
faith in the men and women of the force. Once again, this 
belittling argument has been soundly and routinely 
rejected. See, e.g., Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d at 437; King v. 
Conde, 121 F.R.D. at 192-93; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 
F.R.D. at 665; Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. at 12-13. The City 
is telling this Court that the police officers will not do 
their jobs properly, as they are sworn to do, if truthful 
information is presented in a judicial procedure. Even if 
such unfaithfulness to American justice is as rampant among 
- 17 -
the police as the City contends, that is no reason for this 
Court to condone and encourage such intolerable attitudes. 
Moreover, the City cites no empirical evidence to 
support these claims. In King v. Conde, Judge Weinstein 
cited this very lack of empirical evidence to warn that 
courts should restrict disclosure of this kind of 
information only on the basis of a substantial showing of 
specific harm outweighing the specific interests favoring 
disclosure. King v. Conde, 121 F.RoD, at 193, 
The City also contends this information is 
available through other sources. It cites to the sources 
relied upon by United Television in broadcasting these 
stories. While these sources may have available some of 
this information, obviously, they do not have available the 
entire Internal Affairs files. Furthermore, while these 
sources might be reliable for purposes of meeting 
journalistic responsibilities, there is no showing that 
these sources would qualify to testify concerning these 
records and their content under Utah Rule of Evidence 602. 
United Television is entitled to all relevant information 
and is required to present that evidence at trial in 
accordance with the Rules of Evidence. 
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The City's brief totally ignores the factors 
favoring disclosure. The first and foremost of these is the 
chilling effect on United Television's First Amendmenc 
rights and obligations. This chilling possibility has been 
recognized by no less an authority than the United States 
Supreme Court. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254 (1964) the Court specifically expressed its concern that 
if a media defendant is denied access to exculpatory 
information in a defamation suit, the media defendant may be 
deterred from criticizing official conduct in the future, 
Id. at 279, an undesireable result. 
Furthermore, the City appears to have little 
concern for the public's interest in a fair trial or the 
public's interest in the ascertainment of truth. Both of 
those overwhelming concerns are present in this interest. 
In fact, the Tenth Circuit in Lichtenstein specifically 
recognized that both of these interests were, by themselves, 
compelling interests favoring disclosure of this type of 
information in appropriate cases. This is an appropriate 
case. 
As set forth in United Television's appeal brief at 
26-44, there are compelling reasons requiring production of 
this information. The City, in its brief, does not even 
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attempt to discredit those easily recognized reasons. The 
tired, shop-worn cliches which the City believes demonstrate 
the need for secrecy simply do not outweigh the fundamental 
factors demanding disclosure. 
Vie 
THESE FILES ARE NOT PROTECTED BY 
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
While the City also claims this material is 
protected by the attorney-client privilege, nothing in the 
record demonstrates this information was ever communicated 
to any attorney. Utah Code Ann, §78-24-8(2) applies only to 
a "communication made by the client to [the attorney]." In 
Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 27 Utah 2d 310, 495 P.2d 
1254 (1972), this Court held that the party asserting the 
privilege must demonstrate that the privilege is 
applicable* _Id. 495 P. 2d at 1257. The Court also 
identified the factors to be examined to determine if a 
communication is privileged: 
The communication must be 'for the 
purpose of securing primarily either (i) 
an opinion on law or (ii) legal services 
or (iii) assistance in some legal 
proceeding and not (d) for the purpose of 
committing a crime or tort. . . .' 
Id. citing United States v. United Shoe Machinery, 89 
F.Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950). 
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Not one of the affidavits submitted by the City 
identifies a single communication between the City and any 
attorney concerning these Internal Affairs files. In fact, 
the police department's own procedures do not even suggest, 
much less require, any involvement or coordination between 
the investigating officers and the city attorney during an 
Internal Affairs investigation (United Television Appeal 
Brief, Addendum 3). 
It is the City's burden to show this information is 
privileged. Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 495 P.2d at 
1257. The City has not made the requisite showing. 
VII. 
NO UTAH STATUTE GUARANTEES 
ABSOLUTE SECRECY OF THESE FILES 
The City contends that various Utah statutes 
require this information not be disclosed. Significantly, 
the City cannot cite to a single case acknowledging or even 
implying such a requirement. More importantly, the statutes 
cited by the City, on their face, do not establish any 
guaranteed secrecy. 
The City relies on Utah Code Ann. §78-24-8(5). 
Even if the statute applies, which United Television 
contends it does not, the statute does not guarantee a 
privilege against disclosure. In fact, the statute only 
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limits disclosure "when the public interest would 
suffer . c o o " As noted above in §V, the public interest 
would more likely suffer by non-disclosurec 
Similarly, the City points to Utah Code Ann. §67-
18-5o That statute states: 
The right to examine and copy 
documents in an employee's personnel file 
does not extend to documents classified as 
'confidential' under the Utah Information 
Practices Act, 
The statute by its term only applies to an employee's 
personnel file and not to Internal Affairs investigation 
fileSc Furthermore, there is no basis to claim the Internal 
Affairs files are classified as "confidential" under the 
Utah Archives and Records Services and Information Practices 
Act. Utah Code Ann. §§63-2-59, -89. 
In the Information Practices Act, the legislature 
particularly disavowed any intent to create any guaranteed 
protection from disclosure for this kind of information. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-60 states in pertinent part: 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
• . . 
(2) In enacting this Act, the 
Legislature recognizes two fundamental 
constitutional rights: (a) The right of 
privacy in relation to personnel data 
gathered by state agencies, and (b) the 
public's right of access to information 
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concerning the conduct of the public's 
business. It is the intent of the 
Legislature to establish fair information 
practices to prevent abuse of personal 
information by state agencies while 
protecting the public's right of easy and 
reasonable access to unrestricted public 
records. 
(Emphasis added). 
Even if the legislature intended to create some 
general privacy rights in the statute, there is no 
indication these statutes were designed to govern 
permissible discovery in a judicial action. In fact, other 
state courts, construing similar statutes, have found they 
are not determinative of a litigant's discovery rights. See 
City of Tucson v. Superior Court, 544 P.2d 1113, 1115 
(Ariz.Appc 1976); Byrne v. City and County of Honolulu, 53 3 
P.2d 871 (Haw. 1975); Tighe v. City and County of Honolulu, 
520 P.2d 1345 (Haw. 1974); Cook v. King County, 510 P.2d 659 
(Wash. App. 1973). 
The City also implies some undefined civil rights 
action may be brought if the Internal Affairs files are 
produced. No authority is presented for this dubious 
claim. Judges acting in their judicial capacity and those 
governmental agents acting in response to judicial orders 
are absolutely immune from such actions. See e.g., Harris 
v. Menedez, 817 F.2d 737 (11th Cir. 1987); Demoran v. Witt, 
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781 Fo2d 155 (9th Cir, 1986). The City has not even 
attempted to explain how the potential civil right plaintiff 
may avoid the immunity doctrine if the documents are 
produced in response to a proper subpoena or court order. 
VIII. 
MADSEN'S PERSONNEL FILE IS A BUSINESS RECORD 
NOT PROTECTED BY ANY PRIVILEGE OR ROLE OF EVIDENCE 
Madsen8s personnel file is kept and maintained by 
the Salt Lake City Police Department in the ordinary course 
of its businesSc Since Madsen has placed his "record" with 
the police department specifically at issue in this lawsuit, 
much in the same way a personal injury plaintiff places his 
or her physical condition at issue by bringing suit, Madsen 
has waived any rights of protection he may have enjoyed for 
his personnel file. Seey e.g. , Trans-World Investments v. 
Drobny, 554 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Alaska 1976) where the court 
held that a personal injury plaintiff, by filing suit for 
injuries sustained in a automobile accident, had waived the 
right to withhold medical records under the physician-
patient privilege, C_f. , State v. Foulds, 167 Col. 123, 445 
P.2d 716 (1968) (placing attorney's competence at issue 
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waives attorney-client privileges to communications about 
attorney's alleged carelessness)c1 
If there is any "privilege" to withhold Madsen's 
personnel file, it belongs to Madsen, not the City. Madsen 
has never objected to production of this file despite 
adequate notice the file was being sought in discovery. 
Failure to object in that circumstance is a waiver of any 
privilege Madsen may have had. See e.g., People v. Perry, 
103 Cal. Rptr. 161, 499 P.2d 129 (1972); State v. McGrew, 46 
Or, App. 123, 610 P.2d 1245 (1980). 
Discovery of Officer Madsen's personnel file is 
appropriate because there is no evidentiary privilege 
protecting the information. A personnel file is an 
employee's work record, which the department keeps in the 
ordinary course of business, much as do other employers. By 
law, Madsen has access to his personnel file. Utah Code 
Ann. §67-18-3 (1986). If Officer Madsen has access to this 
file, then United Television must enjoy equal access, 
especially when Madsen has made the matters contained in 
that file an issue in this lawsuit. 
xIn Russo v. Madsen, supra, a case relied upon by 
the City, Magistrate Gould ordered production of sizeable 
portions of Madsen's personnel files. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, United 
Television, Inc. respectfully submits that the trial court 
should be directed to enter an order requiring the Salt Lake 
City Police Department to produce all of the Internal 
Affairs files concerning Officer Madsen without redaction of 
any information. Furthermore, the Court should sustain the 
trial court's ruling that the personnel file must be 
produced. 
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